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Highlights
•	 At	 present,	 the	 common	 cross-border	 cost	 allocation	 practice	 is	 that	 each	
country	pays	for	the	assets	on	its	territory.	The	recently	adopted	Regulation	
(EU)	No	 347/2013	 on	 guidelines	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 European	 en-
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Introduction
A	 first	 list	 of	 so-called	 Projects	 of	 Common	 Interest1	 has	
been	approved	in	Europe,	as	foreseen	in	the	recently	adopted	
Regulation	 (EU)	 No	 347/2013	 on	 guidelines	 for	 the	 imple-
mentation	 of	 European	 energy	 infrastructure	 priorities2 
.	 In	 line	 with	 this	 new	 Regulation,	 the	 projects	 have	 been	














states,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	 that	 investment	 for	 the	
country	where	most	of	 the	assets	happen	 to	be	 located.	As	a	
result,	some	projects	are	delayed	or	not	even	considered,	and	
other	 projects	 are	 distorted	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 dimensioning,	
routing,	or	technology.	
Project	promoters	and	NRAs	therefore	should	have	an	interest	
to	 come	 up	 with	 alternative	 Cross-Border	 Cost	 Allocation	
(CBCA)	 agreements,	 which	 enable	 them	 to	 consider	 cross-
border	compensation	to	improve	the	commitment	of	all	par-






dation	on	 information	 requirement	 and	high-level	 principles	
that	NRAs	shall	follow	when	handling	a	cross-border	cost	allo-
cation	request4.
In	 this	 brief,	 we	 discuss	 three	 paths	 to	 innovation	 in	CBCA	
agreements:	1)	basing	 the	agreements	on	 the	CBA	results;	2)	
entering	 into	 a	 formal	 contract;	 3)	 agreeing	 on	 a	 set	 of	 pro-






3.	 ENTSO-E	 Guideline	 for	 Cost	 Benefit	 Analysis	 of	 Grid	 Development	
Projects.	14	November	2013.







its	decisions,	 and	 identify	 and	disseminate	good	practices	by	
project	promoters	and	NRAs,	like	the	examples	we	will	show-
case	in	this	policy	brief.	




each	 country	 pays	 for	 the	 assets	 on	 its	 territory;	 compensa-
tion	between	countries	 is	not	considered.	 If	 the	costs	are	not	
in	line	with	the	benefits	of	the	countries	hosting	the	line,	this	
might	lead	to	investment	distortions.	The	distortion	could	be	










lation,	 a	CBA	method	 is	 under	 development	 in	Europe	with	
input	from	ENTSO-E,	ACER,	and	academia.	See,	for	instance,	
our	own	policy	brief	on	the	topic5.	But	this	is	a	work	in	progress	








and	 that	 there	 is	 a	high	probability	 that	one	of	 the	countries	
expected	to	invest	in	the	project	is	a	net	loser,	that	loss	could	
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be	compensated	to	avoid	the	risk	that	the	net	loser	delays	the	
project.	 This	 minimum	 compensation	 does	 not	 fully	 align	
incentivizes	 of	 all	 involved	 parties	 to	 develop	 a	 project	 with	
cross-border	impact,	but	at	least	takes	away	a	strong	disincen-
tive.	 Note	 that	 this	 is	 in	 line	 with	 ACER’s	 recommendation	
that,	‘unless	the	relevant	NRAs	agree	otherwise,	compensations	
are	 provided	 only	 if	 at	 least	 one	 country	 hosting	 the	 project	
is	 deemed	 to	have	 a	negative	net	 benefit’.	Note	 also	 that	 this	
approach	reduces	the	risk	that	the	compensation	would	be	per-
ceived	as	unjustified	ex-post.	
Room for regulatory innovation
Between	 the	minimum	standard	 to	be	 guaranteed	by	ACER,	
and	the	complete	improvement	that	might	be	practically	diffi-
cult	to	implement,	there	is	a	lot	of	room	for	innovation	by	pro-
ject	promoters	and	NRAs.	And,	 to	 support	 the	 involved	par-
ties	in	coming	up	with	an	innovative	agreement,	it	is	of	course	




that	 are	 developing	 an	 interconnector,	 and	 they	managed	 to	
agree	on	an	investment	cost	allocation	based	on	CBA	results.	
Our	interpretation	of	the	case	is	that	they	did	not	try	to	imple-
ment	 a	 proportional	 approach,	 but	 they	 did	 go	 beyond	 the	
above-described	minimum	standard.
2. Enter into a formal contract 
Current practice
It	is	not	yet	common	practice	for	project	promoters	from	dif-
ferent	 countries	 that	 are	 jointly	developing	a	project	 to	write	
a	 formal	 contract	 to	 guarantee	 the	 execution	 of	 their	CBCA	
agreement.	As	a	result,	a	project	might	be	delayed	unilaterally,	
or	worse,	one	party	might	 stick	 to	 the	originally	 agreed	date	
while	the	other	does	not	so	that	the	former	has	stranded	costs.	






















Room for regulatory innovation
Between	 the	minimum	standard	 to	be	 guaranteed	by	ACER,	
and	 the	complete	 improvement	 that	might	be	practically	dif-
ficult	 to	 implement,	 there	 is	 a	 lot	 of	 room	 for	 innovation	by	
project	promoters	and	NRAs.	In	one	of	the	two	examples	we	
















tion	process	 for	 strongly	 complementary	projects	 can	distort	
the	development	of	both	projects.	
6.	 Inelfe,	 France-Spain	 Electrical	 Interconnection:	 The	 excava-
tion	 of	 the	 French	 side	 of	 the	 tunnel	 begins.	 Press	 release,	 2012.	
http://www.inelfe.eu/IMG/pdf/ingles_021012_CP_tunnelier_Canig-
ou_-_EN.pdf











defined	 as	 a	 single	 PCI.	 In	 our	 previous	 policy	 brief	 on	 the	
CBA	method	proposed	by	ENTSO-E,	we	already	argued	that	
complementarity	 should	be	measured	on	 an	 economic	basis.	
This	recommendation	has	not	yet	been	 fully	 implemented	 in	
the	sense	that	ENTSO-E	adopts	a	technical	criterion	based	on	
‘increase	of	grid	transfer	capacity’.
Room for regulatory innovation
Between	 the	minimum	standard	 to	be	 guaranteed	by	ACER,	
and	 the	complete	 improvement	 that	might	be	practically	dif-




necessary	 to	 coordinate	 their	 decision-making	 processes	 for	
related	CBCA	 requests.	 In	one	of	 the	 two	 examples	we	 refer	
to	in	this	brief,	the	interaction	between	two	strongly	comple-
mentary	projects	has	been	considered	in	the	CBCA	agreement.
4. Showcasing cross-border cost alloca-
tion innovation
The Case of Norway-Sweden 






Norway	 is	divided	 into	5	bidding	zones	because	 it	has	struc-
tural	congestion	within	the	country.	In	dry	years,	energy	supply	
























the	 development	 of	 Line	 B.	The	 details	 of	 the	 compensation	
are	 not	 publicly	 available,	 but	 has	 probably	 been	 negotiated	










the	CBCA	 agreement	 considers	 the	 interaction	 between	 two	
strongly	complementary	projects.
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import	 cheaper	 electricity	 from	Eastern	 European	 countries,	
like	Albania	and	Turkey,	via	Greece.	
Interpretation:
This	 is	 a	 typical	 case	 with	 a	 transit	 country	 (Greece)	 that	 is	
compensated	 to	 jointly	develop	 the	project	with	 its	neighbor	






elettrica	 e	 il	 gas)	 and	 the	 Regulatory	 Authority	 for	 Energy	 of	 Greece	
(ΡΥΘΜΙΣΤΙΚΗ	ΑΡΧΗ	ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΣ)	for	the	allocation	of	the	electricity	
transfer	capacity	for	the	year	2002	on	the	High	Voltage	Direct	Current	





5. Guidance to project promoters, NRAs 
and ACER







and	 NRAs	 look	 at	 the	 case	 introduced	 here	 for	 inspiration	
for	their	own	projects,	and	consider	each	of	the	three	dimen-
sions	 for	 innovation	 in	CBCA	agreements	 that	we	 identified:	

























9.	 European	Commission,	 Impact	 assessment.	Accompanying	 the	 docu-
ment	Proposal	 for	Regulation	 of	 the	European	Parliament	 and	of	 the	
Council	 on	 guidelines	 for	 trans-European	 energy	 infrastructure	 and	
repealing	Decision	No	1364/2006/EC.	19	October	2011
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The Florence School of Regulation 
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) was founded in 2004 as a partnership between the Council of the European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) and the European University Institute (EUI), and it works closely with the European Commission. The 
Florence School of Regulation, dealing with the main network industries, has developed a strong core of general regulatory 
topics and concepts as well as inter-sectoral discussion of regulatory practices and policies.
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